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Non-Technical Summary 
Between 1991 and 1997 West Germany spent on average about 3.6 bn Euro per year on public sector 
sponsored training programmes for the unemployed. This paper presents evaluation results for 
different forms of West German public sector sponsored training programmes of the mid 1990s. The 
empirical analysis is based on a new administrative data base constructed for evaluation purposes that 
supports selectivity correction by microeconometric matching methods as well as the identification of 
effects over a horizon of more than seven years. We find that all programmes have negative effects in 
the short run and most of them positive effects over a horizon of about four years.  
However, the results for the various programmes differ quit substantially when considering our key 
outcome variable, employment, seven years after programme start, which is the longest horizon for 
which we have reliable outcome information. Retraining, involving the most substantial human capital 
investment, dominates all other programmes as well as nonparticipation. The gain in employment 
probability over nonparticipation is about 10-15%-points. Short and long training dominate 
nonparticipation with a somewhat smaller gain of about 5-9% after seven years. Positive effects for 
practice firms, if any, appear to be too small to be detectible with our sample sizes.  
Focussing on the overall performance over the seven year period, i.e. netting out positive and negative 
effects over time, the findings change somewhat, because the different programmes have different 
lock-in effects that are directly related to their duration. In this comparison, shorter programmes 
(below six months) outperform the rest. Compared to nonparticipation, the gain after seven years 
would be about eight months of additional employment. It is about half for longer training other than 
retraining. For retraining, the initial lock-in effects are so large that a period of seven years is too short 
to allow significant positive effects to be detected, although there is a clear trend towards positive 
overall effects. Finally, no sustainable positive effects are visible for practice firms.  
Our findings help to understand a puzzle that occurred in the previous literature, namely that for most 
training programmes significantly positive effects cannot be found. If we believe the kind of 
consensus of the education literature that returns in earnings of one year of full-time schooling are 5-
10%, then it would be surprising if programmes for unemployed with a duration of a few months or 
much less can have effects large enough to be detectible by noisy data, even if the samples are large. 
Yet, even the group of 'shorter' German programmes are fairly long by international comparisons, and 
particularly retraining involves rather significant human capital investments that can be expected to be 
above the ‘noise-threshold’ level, and are thus detectible in our study. 
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1 Introduction 
In the 1990s many continental European countries used active labour market policies (ALMP) as im-
portant tools to reduce Europe's notoriously high levels of unemployment, without having to go 
through the painful side effects of substantial reforms of the labour markets. Training was considered 
one of the most important and promising components of this policy (ILO, 1998). Recent evaluation 
studies surveyed for example by Fay (1996), Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), and Martin and 
Grubb (2001), however, do not appear to develop any consensus whether these hopes are justified.  
Germany is no exception to these European trends. Quite to the contrary, Germany used training pro-
grammes extensively for two different policy purposes: In East Germany the goal was to qualify the 
labour force used to work in a centrally planned economy for the demands of a market economy. In 
West Germany, the goals were basically the same as in other OECD countries, namely to use training 
programmes to update and increase the human capital of those workers who drop out of the production 
process and become unemployed. Between 1991 and 1997, West Germany alone spent on average 
about 3.6 bn Euro per year on such training programmes. 
Besides proposing improved versions of standard matching estimators for multiple programmes, we 
provide some answers to the question whether individual participants benefit from the fairly long and 
generous German public sector sponsored training (PSST) programmes for the unemployed using a 
microeconometric evaluation approach. We are particularly interested in the question, that even if 
there are positive effects of the different programmes in the short run (which cannot be taken for 
granted according to the evaluation literature for Germany and other countries), whether they can be 
sustained over a longer period of time. Since the German programmes are intensive and long by inter-
national standards, data that cover considerably more than one or two years after the programme are 
crucial for understanding their differential impacts on variables like individual employment. For this 
endeavour we use a new data base that we developed together with a team from the Institute for Em-
ployment Research and the University of Mannheim (see Bender et al., 2004) for the sole purpose of 
enabling the evaluation of German training programmes in the 1990s. With the new administrative 
data we not only can identify different programme types - impossible so far for Germany - but we can 
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identify effects of the programmes for seven to eight years as well. Thus, we provide estimates for ef-
fects that go beyond the usual short-run effects omnipresent in the applied evaluation literature (for 
long-run effects of a US programme, see Hotz, Imbens, and Klerman, 2000). 
Perhaps surprisingly, so far only little is known about the effectiveness of PSST in West Germany, 
basically because of a lack of appropriate data. Most of the previous studies use survey data from the 
German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP)1, e.g. Hujer, Maurer and Wellner (1999b).2 Although with 
this data it is possible to distinguish PSST from other forms of further vocational training, there are not 
enough observations to appropriately account for effect heterogeneity with respect to participants and 
different types of PSST.3 On the other hand, even the few studies that use richer data (see below) do 
not exploit this information to analyse the different forms of PSST although there is substantial het-
erogeneity among them. Moreover, none of the studies conducted so far have analysed long-term ef-
fects of PSST beyond three years after the programme. The two studies that are closest to our study, in 
the sense of using data coming from the same large administrative data source, are Klose and Bender 
(2000) and Speckesser (2004).  
Based on a less informative previous version of our data base, Klose and Bender (2000) analyse the 
effects of PSST for a cohort of participants ending programmes in 1986. They construct a control 
group based on eligibility and a hierarchical matching approach. Based on treatment and control sam-
ples they estimate hazard rate models. They find ambiguous results concerning the employment effects 
of PSST. Speckesser (2004) uses the same evaluation period (1993-1994) and the same version of the 
new data base as we do but restricts his analysis to a special type of PSST and follows observations 
only until 1997.4 He constructs a control group using propensity score matching and then applies non-
                                          
1  The GSOEP data is a yearly questionnaire-based survey that started 1984. It provides individual data on personal and 
socioeconomic characteristics as well as retrospective information on the employment history and participation in training 
programmes. It is the most widely used data source for empirical analyses of the German labour market. 
2  Hujer and Caliendo (2001) give a survey of studies available for Germany. Below, we present only a selection. In 
particular, we omit the first generation of West German evaluation studies, written in German and based on the GSOEP, 
e.g. Pannenberg (1995), Prey (1997, 1999), and Staat (1997). Many more studies are available for East Germany, where 
ALMP are used on a comparatively larger scale. Due to the very different labour market situations in East and West 
Germany, they are not directly relevant here.  
3  Small sample sizes may be one reason why some authors (Pannenberg, 1995; Hujer, Maurer and Wellner, 1999a, c) using 
the GSOEP do not distinguish between PSST and other forms of further vocational training. 
4  He evaluates further training of the form we will classify as short or long training in Section 3.2 yielding 536 observations 
in the treatment group. 
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parametric regression based on the predicted propensity scores to estimate differences in employment 
rates up to three years after the beginning of the programme. The effects are estimated for six subsam-
ples stratified by unemployment duration before the programme and year of participation, thus yield-
ing pretty small sample sizes.5 He finds negative effects for up to one year after the beginning of the 
programme mainly corresponding to the time spent in the programme, but no significant effects later.6 
For our study, as for any evaluation study, there is the question of identification strategies and esti-
mation methods suitable for the specific situation. Angrist and Krueger (1999), Heckman and Robb 
(1986), and Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) provide excellent overviews of available strategies. 
Because we argue that in our data we observe many of the major variables influencing selection as 
well as outcomes, we assume that labour market outcomes and selection are independent conditional 
on these observables (conditional independence assumption, CIA). For these reasons and since our 
sample is fairly large, we use matching estimators accounting for multiple treatments as proposed by 
Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001, 2002a, b). Two of the advantages of this estimator are that it is 
essentially nonparametric and allows unrestricted effect heterogeneity. However, Abadie and Imbens 
(2004a) show that the usual one-to-one matching estimators may exhibit an asymptotic bias term. 
Therefore, we implement a weighted regression based bias removal procedure on-top of the matching. 
Furthermore, we improve the efficiency of one-to-one matching by predicting the matched control 
observation by a weighted mean of similar observations. 
This paper is based on unemployed individuals entering training in 1993 and 1994. The results con-
firm that all programmes have the expected negative lock-in effects in the months after they start (e.g. 
Van Ours, 2004, Gerfin and Lechner, 2002). However, in the longer run some training programmes 
appear to increase employment rates by more than 10% points. Furthermore, we also find that some 
shorter programmes are effective in the short run, but their effects decline as time goes by. This, 
however, is not true for a very intensive full-time programme with a duration of typically two years, 
called retraining, which qualifies for a different profession than the one currently held. The effects for 
this type of programme are not only large, but they are also sustainable over the complete eight year 
                                          
5  Sample sizes range from 57 to 121. 
6  The latter is not surprising: a feature of their data is a strongly decreasing number of observations after 1995. 
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post-programme period we observe. Unfortunately, for this programme the lock-in effect is very 
substantial as well. 
The plan of the paper is as follows: The next section gives the stylised facts of the German labour 
market policies and explains the institutional arrangements of the unemployment insurance system. 
Furthermore, it gives the details of the active labour market policies, with special attention to training. 
Section 3 discusses data issues, like definitions of programmes and the selection of the population as 
well as the sample. In Section 4, we discuss the selection processes into the programmes and provide 
descriptive statistics as well as estimates of a multivariate probit model to empirically characterise 
participants in the different programmes. In Section 5, we discuss our identification and estimation 
strategy. Section 6 contains the results for different outcome variables and different groups of partici-
pants, as well as sensitivity analyses. Section 7 concludes. Appendix A contains more information on 
the data. Finally, an appendix that can be downloaded from the internet (denoted as 'Internet 
Appendix' in this text) presents additional background information and several details the interested 
reader may find useful.7 
2 Labour market policies in Germany 
2.1 The unemployment insurance system and the active labour market policy 
In Germany, it is the Federal Employment Agency (FEA) which executes the passive and active la-
bour market policy. In the period we are interested in, the early 1990s, the legal basis for the activities 
of the FEA is the Employment Promotion Act (Arbeitsförderungsgesetz, EPA) which regulates the 
policy measures available to the caseworkers in the labour offices.8 Measures of passive labour market 
policy include different forms of income support during unemployment. Each employee covered by 
the social insurance system has to pay contributions to the unemployment insurance system (UI). The 
total UI contribution is shared equally between employer and employee. To acquire a legal entitlement 
                                          
7  www.siaw.unisg.ch/lechner/lmw_fuu. 
8  The EPA was enacted in 1969. Since then it was subject to various amendments. On January 1st, 1998, the EPA was 
abolished and replaced by Social Code III. However, since this paper analyses public sector sponsored training 
programmes in 1993-1994, we refer to the EPA legislation effective in 1993-1994 everywhere in this paper. The 
legislation relevant for 1993 is taken from BA (1993a), that for 1994 from BA (1995a). 
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to unemployment benefits (Arbeitslosengeld, UB) in general, an employee has to contribute for at least 
360 calendar days within an entitlement qualification period of three years before the beginning of the 
unemployment spell. In addition, the potential claimant has to be registered with the labour office, 
available for job placement, willing to participate in ALMP measures, and he has to apply formally for 
UB (§§ 100-104 EPA).  
The minimum duration of UB entitlement is 156 days. The maximum duration increases with the total 
duration of insured employment within an extended entitlement qualification period of seven years, 
and age.9 Unemployed individuals entitled to UB receive 68% of their average income in the three 
months prior to the unemployment spell if they have at least one dependent child and 63% without 
children (§§ 111-115 EPA). Additional labour income can be earned up to some maximum amount but 
reduces the amount of UB received accordingly (§ 115 EPA). The UB payment can be suspended for 
up to eight weeks if the unemployed refuses to accept a suitable job offered by the labour office 
(where suitability is defined by the EPA and the FEA) or to participate in (most) ALMP measures, or 
if he prematurely quits such a measure (this is of course not relevant if he finds a job; § 119 EPA). 
Participation in ALMP measures has direct implications for UB entitlement. Times in which individu-
als participate in training and receive income support from the FEA count in the same way towards 
future benefits as insured employment does for both the acquisition and the duration of an UB claim (§ 
107 (1) No. 5d EPA). This implies that participating in public sector sponsored training can lead to the 
acquisition of a new UB claim or to the prolongation of an existing one. 
Unemployed individuals having exhausted their UB and not yet acquired a new claim can receive un-
employment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe, UA) if they register with the labour office, are available for 
job placement, are willing to participate in ALMP measures, and if they are needy (means test for the 
unemployed and his/her partner). The UA payment amounts to 58% of the average income in the three 
month prior to the unemployment spell with at least one dependent child and to 56% otherwise. As 
with UB, additional earnings while receiving UA will reduce the payment accordingly.  
According to the EPA, ALMP in Germany aims at achieving and maintaining a high level of employ-
ment in the economy, as well as at improving the employment structure in order to encourage eco-
                                          
9  § 106 EPA. For an UE below age 42, the maximum duration is 312 days, above age 54 it is 832 days. 
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nomic growth. In particular, these measures seek to prevent or reduce unemployment and underem-
ployment, to improve job-related mobility, to prevent or eliminate adverse effects of structural change 
in the economy, to improve the labour market integration of disadvantaged people, and to eliminate 
gender discrimination in the labour market.  
Table 2.1: Expenditure on active and passive labour market policies 1991-1997  
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Total expenditure in million DM 48912 55125 69286 70619 76816 84795 83673 
     Shares of total expenditure for active and passive labour market policy in % 
Training 13 12 10 9 10 10 8 
Temporary wage subsidy 1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 
Short time work 1 2 5 2 1 1 1 
Job creation schemes 6 6 4 4 4 4 3 
Early retirement 1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 
Rehabilitation programmes 7 7 6 5 4 4 4 
Unemployment benefits 33 36 43 47 46 46 47 
Unemployment assistance 14 14 15 18 19 21 23 
Other expenditure 25 23 18 16 15 14 13 
Unemployment rate in % 6.2 6.4 8.0 9.0 9.1 9.9 10.8 
Sources:  BA (1993b, 1995b, 1996-1998). 
Notes: Expenditures in million DM (approx. 500,000 Euro) for West Germany. Training: further training, retraining, short 
programmes according to §41a EPA (abolished at the end of 1992). Temporary wage subsidies are subsidies dur-
ing the phase of initial skill adaptation in a new job (Einarbeitungszuschüsse). Short time work: Kurzarbeit. Job 
creation schemes (JCS): Arbeitsbeschaffungsmassnahmen. Early retirement: Vorruhestand/ Altersteilzeit/ Alters-
übergangsgeld. Unemployment benefits (UB): Arbeitslosengeld. 'Other expenditure' mainly includes counselling 
and job placement services as well as administrative costs of the FEA. 
Besides counselling and job placement services, the most important instruments of German ALMP in 
the 1990s were training programmes, short time work, job creation schemes, early retirement schemes, 
and rehabilitation programmes. Table 2.1 displays the expenditure for different measures of passive 
and active labour market policies in West Germany for the years 1991-1997. There was first relatively 
moderate and then rising unemployment and most of the expenditure was devoted towards UB and 
UA. The structure of expenditures for ALMP was relatively stable. Training was by far the most util-
ised instrument, followed by rehabilitation programmes. Table 2.2 presents corresponding numbers of 
participants in those ALMP measures that were quantitatively most important in West Germany in the 
years 1991-1997. 
Training programmes - which are the subject of this study - have always played an important role in 
West Germany. They are supposed to adjust the skills of an individual to the current and future re-
quirements of the labour market. Durations range from a few days to three years. The objectives and 
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different types of these training programmes are described in more detail below in Section 2.2. In 1991 
about 600,000 individuals participated in training measures. There was a significant decline in 1993 to 
about 350,000 participants and to 275,000 participants in 1997 due to a policy change. 
Table 2.2: Participants in the quantitatively most important ALMP measures 1991-1997 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Training (total) a) 601 582 350 308 402 378 275 
    Further training (in % of total) 71 72 76 73 77 77 76 
    Short programmes (in % of total) 9 8 - - - - - 
    Retraining (in % of total) 12 14 21 24 20 20 21 
    Temporary wage subsidy 9 5 3 3 3 3 3 
Job creation schemes b) 83 78 51 57 70 70 59 
Short time work b) 145 283 767 275 128 206 133 
Sources: BA (1993b, 1995b, 1996-1998). 
Notes: a) Total number of inflows in 1000 persons. b) Yearly average in 1000 persons. Short programmes are courses 
according to §41a EPA (abolished at the end of 1992). Temporary wage subsidies are subsidies during the phase 
of initial skill adaptation in a new job (Einarbeitungszuschüsse). Job creation schemes (JCS): Arbeitsbeschaffungs-
massnahmen. Short time work (STW): Kurzarbeit. 
Short time work (Kurzarbeit, STW) can reduce layoffs due to temporary unanticipated reductions in a 
firm's labour demand. Workers in STW work only a few hours per week or month and receive income 
support to supplement their reduced labour income. With 767,000 participants STW was used exten-
sively in 1993 when the recession of the world economy started to affect West Germany and, as a re-
sult, unemployment increased significantly. In contrast, in the other years in the period 1991-1997, the 
number of participants did not exceed 285,000. 
Job creation schemes (JCS) provide additional jobs outside the regular labour market which have to be 
in the interest of the public. Additional means that the job would not have been provided otherwise 
and that it does not compete with any job in the regular labour market. In contrast to East Germany, 
JCS only play a minor role in West Germany. The number of participants declined from 83,000 in 
1991 to 59,000 in 1997 with a temporary increase to 70,000 in 1995/96. Other ALMP measures less 
important in West Germany but extensively used in East Germany are early retirement schemes which 
seek to reduce unemployment directly by reducing the labour supply of older individuals.  
Rehabilitation programmes range from different kinds of training to wage subsidies, and they are specifically 
targeted at (re)integrating disabled people and individuals with certain kinds of health limitations into the labour 
market. 
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2.2 Training as a part of the active labour market policy  
In Germany, training consists of heterogeneous instruments which differ largely in the form and the 
intensity of the human capital investment as well as in their respective duration. Five groups of train-
ing programmes can be distinguished: (i) short programmes,10 (ii) vocational training,11 (iii) further 
training, (iv) retraining, and (v) German language courses.12 Due to data limitations, the subject of this 
study are further training and retraining programmes that are now described in more detail: Further 
training comprises a variety of different forms of training. The courses offered either (a) assess, main-
tain or improve the occupational knowledge and skills of the participant, (b) adjust skills to techno-
logical changes, (c) facilitate a career improvement, or (d) award a first professional degree (§§ 41, 43 
EPA). The duration of a full-time course that does not award a professional degree should in general 
not exceed one year but it can be extended to a total of up to two years if this is deemed appropriate.13  
One form of further training, belonging to category (a) or (b), are courses in so-called practice firms 
which simulate - though under very realistic conditions - working in a specific field of profession. 
There are two forms of practice firms which either simulate the commercial part of a company (ad-
ministration, accounting, customer relations, etc.) or the manufacturing part.14 The mean duration of 
courses in practice firms was seven months in 1994, 12% of participants did spend no more than three 
months in practice firms.15  
Career improvement measures which enable participants to obtain a higher professional degree (e.g. 
master craftsman, technician or a (below university) degree in business administration) had a mean 
                                          
10  Short programmes were courses according to §41a EPA which had a maximum duration of nine weeks and provided 
information on the services available from the FEA, an initial skills assessment as well as basic job search assistance. 
These measures were abolished at the end of 1992. Thus, they are not part of our analysis. 
11  In some special cases the FEA supports regular vocational training in the German apprenticeship system through payment 
of income support. 
12  Immigrants from Eastern Europe with German origin who participate in such courses can receive income support for up to 
six months from the FEA which also pays for the direct programme costs. 
13  § 10 Anordnung des Verwaltungsrates der Bundesanstalt über die individuelle Förderung der beruflichen Fortbildung und 
Umschulung (A FuU). 
14  For the commercial part, there exists a Germany- and Europe-wide network of practice firms that trade 'virtual' goods and 
services with each other to provide realistic conditions for participants who are the practice firm's employees. The skills 
acquired correspond to what is required for the specific job held within the practice firm, e.g. that of an accountant. 
Courses in practice firms representing the manufacturing part, on the other hand, are very heterogeneous ranging from 
specialist training in technical professions over obtaining a driver's licence for special vehicles to just practising 
bricklaying. 
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duration of ten months in 1994, with 24% having a duration of more than one year. In 1994, partici-
pants in courses that award a first professional degree spent 13 months on average in the programme. 
However, the dropout rate was rather high at 19%. 
Retraining enables working in a different profession than the one currently held by qualifying for a 
new professional degree (§ 47 EPA). A full-time retraining measure has to reduce the duration of a 
regular vocational training course in the German apprenticeship system by at least one year.16 The 
mean duration in 1994 was 22 months, 20% of the participants spent more than two years in the pro-
gramme. On average, only about two thirds of the participants completed the programme success-
fully.17  
Table 2.3: Original and target professions of participants in retraining 1994 (shares in %) 
 Original professions of retraining participants 
Target profession None Agriculture Mining Manufacturing Engineering Services Other Total No. of obs. 
Missing 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 
Agriculture 4 0 14 0 0 3 0 3 16 
Mining 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.2 1 
Manufacturing 31 40 29 34 19 5 0 27 143 
Engineering 3 0 14 6 23 1 0 4 22 
Services 58 60 43 56 58 86 100 62 337 
Other 3 0 0 3 0 5 0 3 18 
% of all observ. 55 2 1 18 5 18 0.4 100 540 
No. of obs. 297 10 7 99 26 99 2 540  
Source: Sample of participants in public sector sponsored retraining (for details about the data, see Section 3.1). 
Table 2.3 shows the original and target professions for a sample of retraining participants in 1994. Al-
most two thirds of the participants were trained towards a profession in the service sector. Data on all 
retraining participants reveal that most of these individuals were trained as office workers, or as work-
ers in the social or health services (BA, 1995b). The second largest group (more than one fourth) are 
target professions in the manufacturing sector, with most participants trained as locksmiths, mechan-
ics, electricians and construction workers (BA, 1995b). One striking fact apparent in Table 2.3 is that 
55% of the retraining participants seem not to have any formal professional degree before entering the 
program. This fact can be observed not only for 1994. Normally, participation in retraining requires a 
                                                                                                                                   
15  If not stated otherwise, the numbers reported in this section originate from own calculations based on a sample of 
participants in public sector sponsored training. For a description of the data see Section 3.1.  
16  § 10 AFuU. Durations of apprenticeships range from two to three years. 
17  1994: 67.4%, dropout rate 28.3%, 4.2% failed. 
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first professional degree; otherwise the individual can only participate in other forms of training 
which, for example, award a first professional degree. However, it seems that it was common practice 
to refer individuals without any formal professional degree but presumably with a substantial record of 
work experience in a certain field of profession to retraining. 
Participation in further training and retraining can be supported by the FEA through payment of a 
maintenance allowance (MA)18 and by bearing the direct costs of the programme such as course fees 
and study material, as well as covering parts of additional expenses for child care, transportation and 
accommodation. In 1994, expenditure of the FEA for further training and retraining amounted to 4.2 
bn DM for payment of MA plus 2.1 bn DM for programme costs (in total about 3.1 bn Euro; BA, 
1995b).19 Both full-time and part-time, and in some very rare cases also distance learning courses are 
supported.20 In addition to pure classroom training a course can include on-the-job training (OJT). This 
is frequently the case in courses that award a professional degree since OJT is mandatory in the Ger-
man apprenticeship system with only very few exceptions.  
Target groups of further training and retraining are defined by eligibility rules. In the period under 
consideration, FEA support for training was restricted to individuals with a first professional degree or 
a minimum number of years of work experience.21 In addition, the potential participant had to be either 
unemployed, directly threatened with unemployment, or without any professional degree. Since FEA 
support of further training and retraining measures is funded out of UI contributions, an additional 
requirement was a minimum amount of insured employment (two years) or, alternatively, receipt of 
UB or UA before entering the programme (§ 46 EPA). Individuals who did not meet these additional 
requirements could only apply for reimbursement of the costs of the programme.22  
                                          
18  Until 1993 the amount of MA received was 73% of the previous net income with at least one dependent child and 65% 
without children. In 1994, the replacement rates were reduced to 67% and 60%, respectively, which is the same amount as 
unemployment benefits. 
19  More disaggregated information about the costs of specific programmes is not publicly available in Germany. 
20  In 1994 more than 95% of retraining programmes and courses in practice firms were full-time courses. For other forms of 
further training, the fraction of part-time courses ranged from 7-15%.  
21  Until the end of 1993 the requirement was a formal professional degree plus three years of work experience, or no degree 
but at least six years of work experience. From 1994 on, the work experience requirement was abolished for individuals 
with a formal professional degree and reduced to three years for all others. 
22  §§ 42, 44-45 EPA. Until the end of 1993 individuals who did not meet these requirements had the possibility to apply for 
MA as a loan. 
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3 Defining the estimation sample and the programmes 
3.1  The new database 
We use administrative data from three different sources which have been made available to the scien-
tific community only recently: the IAB Employment Subsample (ES), the benefit payment register 
(BPR), and the training participant data (TPD).23 Table 3.1 provides a description of the main features 
of these data sets. The three data sets were merged to obtain an integrated data base that covers not 
only participant information but as well the full history of insured employment and benefit receipt for 
both participants and nonparticipants in public sector sponsored training. The merged data base con-
tains information for 208,928 individuals (54,756 of whom registered as training participants in the 
TPD) from 1975 to 1997. Here, we use supplementary data on the employment history and a record of 
benefit receipt up to the year 2001 for the individuals included in the original data sets as well.24 
The outcome of this exercise of making administrative data that were collected for different purposes 
available to the scientific community is a data base that is the most comprehensive one in Germany 
with respect to training conducted prior to 1998. It contains many, if not most, variables influencing 
the selection process into these programmes (see the appendix for a list of variables used in our analy-
sis), it allows a fairly precise measurement of interesting outcome variables, particularly those related 
to individual employment status, it contains information about different programme types and it has a 
decently large number of observations for the major programme groups. Finally, it covers a period of 
more than 25 years. 
                                          
23  The common German abbreviations for these data sources are IABS, LED and FuU. A detailed description of the ES is 
provided by Bender et al. (1996) and Bender, Haas and Klose (2000). For the TPD see Miquel, Wunsch and Lechner 
(2002). 
24  Following the abolishment of the EPA and introduction of Social Code III on January 1st, 1998, data collection and 
processing has been changed as well. The new data are similar to the data formerly included in the IABS and in the LED. 
See Appendix A.2 for a comparison of the different definitions of the outcome variables before and after this break in data 
collection. 
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Table 3.1: Combined data sources used  
 ES BPR TPD 
Source Employer supplied mandatory 
social insurance entries. 
Benefit payment register of 
the FEA 1975-1997. 
Questionnaires filled in by the 
labour officer for statistical pur-
poses (ST35). 
Population 1% random sample of persons 
covered by social insurance for at 
least one day 1975-1997. Self-
employed, civil servants, university 
students are not included. 
Recipients of UA, UB, or MA, 
1975-1997. 
Participants in further training, 
retraining, short programmes 
(§41a EPA), German language 
courses and temporary wage 
subsidies 1975-1997. 
Available 
information 
Personal characteristics and history 
of employment.  
Information about the receipt 
of benefit payments, mainly 
UB, UA, MA. 
Personal characteristics of par-
ticipants and information about 
training programmes. 
Important 
variables 
Gender, age, nationality, education, 
profession, employment status, 
industrial sector, firm size, earnings, 
regional information. 
Type and amount of benefits 
received. 
Type, duration and result of the 
programme, type of income 
support paid during participation. 
Structure Spells based on daily information. Spells based on daily informa-
tion. 
Spells based on monthly infor-
mation. 
Note:  The merged data is based on monthly information. For detailed information on the merging and recoding proce-
dures see Bender et al. (2004). The creation of this data base is a result of a three year joint project of research 
groups at the Universities of Mannheim (Bergemann, Fitzenberger, Speckesser) and St. Gallen (Lechner, Miquel, 
Wunsch) as well as the Institute for Employment Research of the FEA (Bender). 
Of course, there are several drawbacks as well, four of those could be important: First, there are sev-
eral groups of individuals, like nonworking recipients of social assistance, self-employed, and civil 
servants ("Beamte"), who are not paying social insurance contributions and are thus not covered by 
these data. Second, employment that is not subject to social security contributions cannot be observed, 
and it is impossible to distinguish between subsidised employment (like in job creation schemes) and 
regular employment in the first labour market. Third, the training information prior to 1993 does not 
appear to be complete and correctly coded. Fourth, individual information about the unemployed as 
assessed by the caseworker (like in Gerfin and Lechner, 2002) is missing. Despite these drawbacks, 
given that so far evaluation studies for Germany relied on much smaller survey data requiring sub-
stantial aggregation across programmes, this data base must be considered a very substantial im-
provement in several dimensions, like sample size, selection and outcome information, and pro-
gramme heterogeneity. 
3.2 Definition of programmes and programme participation 
When aggregating the specific training programme types into groups we use the following criteria: 
homogeneity of subprogrammes with respect to selection, to contents and to organisation, sample size, 
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and information available to reliably distinguish subprogramme types. Table 3.2 shows the resulting 
five different groups plus a residual category. Because of sample size considerations, only the first 
four groups are subject of this evaluation. 
Table 3.2: Definition of programme types 
Programme Description 
Practice firm Further training that simulates a job in a specific field of profession. 
Short training Further training (i) with the aim of a general adjustment of working skills in the profession held; 
(ii) to obtain an additional qualification in the profession held; (iii) to obtain a first professional 
degree; planed duration ≤ 6 months.   
Long training Same types as short training with a planed duration > 6 months.  
Retraining Training to obtain a new professional degree in a field other than the profession currently held. 
Career improvement Further training to obtain a higher professional degree, e.g. master craftsman, technician, or a 
(below university) degree in business administration. 
German language courses: for immigrants from Eastern Europe with German origin; partici-
pants receive income support during participation. 
Temporary wage subsidies: for individuals with reduced productivity e.g. due to long-term un-
employment who take up a regular job during the phase of initial skill adaptation (Einarbei-
tungszuschüsse) for usually 6 month, sometimes up to 12 months; 30-50% of the wage. 
Other 
   
Training while being employed.   
Note:  After selecting the sample of interest, sample sizes for career improvements are too small. Other is a residual 
category that comprises very heterogeneous, small programmes. Therefore, those two groups are not evaluated. 
The programmes considered here do not only differ with respect to the type of training received, but 
they also differ substantially with respect to the planned duration of a programme. Figure 3.1 indicates 
that typical German programmes are much longer than for example Swiss programmes (see Gerfin and 
Lechner, 2002). Ignoring other and career improvement which are not subject of our analysis, Figure 
3.1 shows that even short programmes typically have a duration of about five months (mean: four), 
long programmes are clustered at nine or twelve months, and retraining has a typical duration of 21 
months to two years, with some programmes even planned for three years. Thus, these programmes 
intend substantial investments in human capital. Although there is a clear peak at six months for prac-
tice firms, their duration appears to be much more heterogeneous than for the other programmes. 
 16
Figure 3.1: Distribution of the planned programme duration  
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Note:  This is the planned duration of a programme determined before the programme starts. 
Next, we define participation in one of the six programme groups. Since the programme participation 
data (TPD) is of good quality only after 1992, we consider programme participation between 1993 and 
1994. This allows us to focus on fairly recent programmes while at the same time still having an ob-
servation period that allows us to detect long-run effects.25 A person is included in our evaluation sam-
ple if she starts an unemployment spell between 1993 and 1994. The treatment group consists of all 
persons entering a programme between the beginning of the first unemployment spell after 1992 and 
the end of 1994.26 If there are multiple treatments over time only the first one is included in the analy-
sis if it occurred between 1993 and 1994. Clearly, the crucial issues here are how we define the non-
participation status and the disregard of second, third, etc. programmes. 
Taking up the arguments in Fredriksson and Johansson (2003), the fact that we condition the nonpar-
ticipation status on ending unemployment without entering a programme (or not ending unemploy-
ment at all) before 1995 might lead to some bias in our results in favour of the so-defined nonpartici-
                                          
25  Furthermore, since we observe only training spells after the participant left training, and some courses have a duration of 
more than two years, and there is no training information after 1997, concentrating on the years 1993 and 1994 does not 
lead to a selective under representation of long training spells. 
26  For a figure showing the start date distribution of this defining UE spell see the internet appendix. 
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pation status. This bias should be severe if nearly every unemployed has to participate. However, as 
will become clear from the descriptive statistics, this is by far not the case. 
The left panel of Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of starting months in the two-year window we con-
sider. Partly due to the construction of our sample, the probability of treatment increases over time. 
The right panel of Figure 3.2 shows the months it takes until participation after the beginning of the 
'defining' unemployment spell (the first UE spell between 1993 and 1994). With the exception of ca-
reer improvement, which is not considered in the evaluation, the start date distribution is pretty ho-
mogenous across treatments. Nevertheless, retraining appears to be used very early in the spell, be-
cause about 45% of the participants start within in the first three months. Note however, again, that the 
combination of our definition of 'defining' UE spell beginning 1993 or 1994 and training be observed 
not later than Dec. 1994, clustering in the first two months is rather natural. 
Figure 3.2: Monthly distribution of start dates (in %) 
          Month of programme start            Number of months until treatment 
   
 
Note:  The treatments other and career are not considered in the evaluation below. The right panel shows the number of 
months until participation after the beginning of the 'defining' unemployment spell. 
Given our definition of a small treatment window (although in many cases, much smaller windows are 
used in the literature, e.g. Gerfin and Lechner, 2002), it is particularly important for the interpretation 
of our results which share of the control groups receives treatment as well (similar to the problem of 
substitution bias in an experiment). Furthermore, there is the issue of programme careers, i.e. UE par-
ticipating in more than one programme over time. The conceptual problem with analysing the effect of 
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e.g. the second participation is that it might be subject to sample selection influenced by the effect of 
the first programme. Thus, such an analysis of the effects of sequences of programmes requires a dy-
namic evaluation approach as suggested by Miquel and Lechner (2001), or Lechner (2004), which is 
not feasible with our data without further aggregation of programme types, which is undesirable for 
obvious reasons. 
Table 3.3: Participation in different programme types in % of participants in subsamples until 1997 
 Treatment status in study (first treatment) 
Programme participa-
tion between 1993 and 
1997  
Nonpartici-
pation 
Practice 
firm 
Short train-
ing  
Long 
training  
Retraining Career 
improve-
ment 
Other  
Practice firm 1.6 3.7 0.9 1.2 0.5 0.9 1.4 
Short training 4.8 4.0 7.3 2.7 1.2 3.6 1.4 
Long training 3.2 4.4 4.7 4.9 1.5 2.7 2.7 
Retraining 1.2 1.5 4.4 1.5 1.0 0.0 1.4 
Career improvement 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 
Other 0.5 0.7 1.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 2.7 
Total other treatments 
than first treatment 11.4 11.0 11.9 5.5 3.4 7.3 6.8 
Note: Entries show the fraction (%) of members of the subsamples stated in the columns who participated at least once 
in the treatments stated in rows after their first treatment (programme participants) or after 1994 (nonparticipants). 
Due to data restrictions only training spells completed by the end of 1997 are observable. 
Table 3.3 shows the share of observations defined by the first treatment in 1993 and 1994, or the ab-
sence of it, who participate in additional programmes. First of all, note that only about 11% of nonpar-
ticipants receive some sort of training until the end of 1997. A similar share of the shorter pro-
grammes, practice firm and short training, shows about the same amount of other programmes, but 
more than one third of those participants in practice firms and two thirds of those in short training 
who participate more than once, participate in a programme belonging to the same programme group. 
For the other programmes, in particular for the longest programme retraining, subsequent participa-
tions occur only in rare cases (3%). To conclude, Table 3.3 provides clear evidence that the effect we 
will estimate are very close to the 'pure' effect of the programme used to define the treatment status. 
3.3 Selection of population and sample 
When choosing the appropriate population, we aim at having a homogenous group of people covering 
the prime age part of the population of West Germany. Thus, we do not consider the capital, Berlin, 
because the regional information for Berlin is not precise enough to attribute a particular individual to 
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the former East German or West German parts of the town. Furthermore, we aim to ensure that all 
people are eligible: We require that everybody was employed at least once prior to programme partici-
pation and that they were receiving UB or UA in the month of and before the programme starts.27 This, 
however, requires the use of variables which are measured relatively to the programme start. We fol-
low one of the approaches suggested by Lechner (1999) and simulate start dates for nonparticipants by 
drawing start dates from the empirical distribution for participants and then ensuring that this date 
does not lie before the beginning of the 'defining' UE spell or after the end of the person's last spell 
that is observed in the data. Nonparticipants that do not satisfy this criterion are excluded from the 
sample. To avoid most influences coming from retirement, early retirement and primary education, we 
also impose an age restriction (20-55 years) before entering the programme. Concentrating on the 
main body of the active labour force we furthermore exclude trainees, persons in apprenticeships, per-
sons whose last employment was less intensive in terms of hours than half of a full-time equivalent, 
and persons who were home workers before the 'defining' UE spell. 
Table 3.4: Sample selection rules  
 Nonpar-
ticipation 
Practice 
firm 
Short 
training  
Long 
training  
Retraining Career 
improv. 
Other  
Persons entering unemployment 
between Jan. '93 and Dec. '94 
36965 324 644 380 497 130 103 
Simulated programme start after the entry in unemployment (UE) and before the end of the observation period 
Remaining observations 26022 324 644 380 497 130 103 
Eligibility: Only individuals receiving UB or UA in the month of and before the programme start  
Remaining observations 13091 309 618 350 450 118 92 
Personal characteristics :  a) 20 ≤ age ≤ 55;  b) no trainees or apprentices; c) at least one observation of employment; 
                 d) no home workers; e) no part-time worker less than half of a full-time work 
Final sample  9197 273 572 329 413 110 74 
Note:  All variables are measured before or in the same year as the start of the programme. 
                                          
27  'Employed' means that we observe the person at least once in an insured employment spell in the ES. With respect to 
eligibility receipt of UB or UA directly before entering a programme is not sufficient. Individuals must also meet the 
requirement of either having a formal professional degree plus three years of work experience (since 1994 zero years), or 
alternatively, at least six years (since 1994 three years) of work experience, where times of registered unemployment also 
count as work experience up to half of the required minimum number of years. Since we also require individuals to be 
employed at least once before the programme, the only group of non-eligibles we do not exclude from the sample are 
individuals without any professional degree that have not (yet) acquired sufficient work experience. Insufficient work 
experience might also affect eligibility of individuals having a professional degree who have been assigned a simulated 
programme start date in 1993. However, both groups are very small so that eligibility is captured sufficiently well by our 
selection criteria. One might argue that we are overly strict in selecting our sample since we disregard short episodes of 
individuals not observed in the data which may be due to suspension of UB or UA for up to eight weeks. However, the 
reasons for not being observed in the data are very heterogeneous (self-employment, receipt of social assistance, out of 
labour force, etc.) we prefer to exclude these cases altogether. 
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Table 3.4 shows how the sample shrinks imposing these criteria successively. We end up with a sam-
ple of about 9,000 nonparticipants and about 270 to 570 participants in the four programme groups we 
consider in the econometric analysis. The number of participants in career improvement and other is 
too small to compute a precise treatment effect. 
4 The determinants of programme participation 
4.1 Eligibility, assignment and self-selection into programmes 
As in every evaluation study, the key to address the sample selection (endogeneity) problem is to ob-
tain an understanding of how different individuals end up in different programmes. Instead of postu-
lating a complete structural model for the selection process, we discuss the main determinants of selec-
tion and then explain which observable variables are used to capture them. The determinants can be 
divided into two groups: those required by legislation (eligibility), and those that may be underlying 
the decisions of the caseworker and the unemployed. 
Beginning with the role of the legislation, remember that to become eligible for FEA support an un-
employed must hold a first professional degree or have a minimum number of years of work experi-
ence.28 In addition, the potential participant has to be either unemployed, directly threatened with 
unemployment, or without any professional degree. If not receiving UB or UA directly before entering 
a programme, individuals must be employed for at least two years within the three years prior to the 
programme. As discussed in Section 3.3 (in particular in footnote 35) our selected sample fulfils the 
eligibility rules. 
When these conditions are met, then the unemployed could be offered a programme by her case-
worker. Before going into the details of the determinants underlying the selection decisions of both 
parties, it is helpful to understand the rules of their interaction. The unemployed and her caseworker 
meet at least every three months in order to discuss the job search efforts of the unemployed since 
their last meeting, new job offers available, potential benefits of participating in labour market pro-
                                          
28  The exact requirement is a formal professional degree plus three (since 1994 zero) years of work experience, or no degree 
but at least six (since 1994 three) years of work experience.  
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grammes, as well as potential adaptations of their strategy for getting the unemployed back to work.29 
Usually it is the caseworker but it may also be the unemployed herself who proposes participation in 
training to improve her chances of finding a job. In any case, the unemployed must apply for FEA 
support before the beginning of the programme, and the caseworker decides whether or not she will 
receive support. There is no legal entitlement to FEA support, and caseworkers have a considerable 
amount of discretion in making their decision about programme participation. However, they have to 
use this discretion in accordance with the objectives of the EPA as well as the specific aims of the 
programme (§ 33 EPA). They also have to consider the situation and development of the labour mar-
ket, and they have to act based on the principle of economic efficiency. In addition, caseworkers have 
to take into account the aptitude of the applicant for specific jobs and her chances for completing a 
specific programme successfully (§ 36 EPA). In particular, the caseworker's decision has to be guided 
by the consideration which of the measures available have the highest chances for success and are the 
least costly, that is, most efficient for a specific individual (§ 7 A FuU). 
Usually the caseworker decides in consultation with the potential participant whether or not and if so 
what kind of training programme would be appropriate based on an assessment of the employment 
prospects of the UE. Since the willingness to participate in labour market programmes is a precondi-
tion for receipt of UB and UA, UE who refuse to apply or, having applied, refuse to participate in a 
training measure risk suspension of their benefits for up to eight weeks.30 
Given our knowledge about the 'average' selection process, the caseworker's decision about referral of 
applicants to specific programmes may be guided by two objectives: efficiency or equity. Caseworkers 
pursuing efficiency goals assign those individuals to the programmes that are expected to benefit most 
from them. In contrast, equity goals require caseworkers to select the neediest individuals into the 
programmes, where neediness is defined by some criterion, e.g. a high risk of becoming long-term 
unemployed. The factors relevant for pursuing the latter policy can probably be best approximated in 
our data by the employment and unemployment history (Heckman and Smith, 1999, 2004, point out 
                                          
29  The caseworker can schedule a meeting at any time but at least every three months, e.g. in order to check the availability 
of the unemployed for job placement, or to discuss new job offers or participation in labour market programmes. 
Attendance is compulsory for the unemployed. See § 132 EPA. 
30  They may even loose their entitlement altogether if benefits have already been suspended before (§ 119 EPA). 
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the importance of this information in the context of analysing participation in the Job Training Part-
nership Act (JTPA) in the United States) as well as the economic situation of the individual, which are 
largely determined by the last job, educational attainment, nationality and family status since these 
variables govern chances in the labour market. These factors may also be related to the effect maxi-
mising strategy. In addition, we would expect that participation declines with age, because the amorti-
sation period of the human capital investment shrinks. Furthermore, as mentioned for example again 
by Heckman and Smith (1999), the state of the local economy may also be a factor influencing the 
decision of sending somebody into a programme or not. The caseworker may, however, be supply 
constrained and not able to offer what he considers best. Yet this is not so important here, because it 
can plausibly be assumed that conditional on all other variables like the regional information, this 
variable is not correlated with the outcomes. 
From the point of view of the unemployed, his decision whether or not to participate in a programme 
is guided by considerations very similar to those of the caseworker. There are, however, additional 
reasons for joining or not joining a programme: If the unemployed sees no chance to find a job any-
way, with or without a programme, he may prefer not to join a programme which reduces his leisure 
time. Again, we capture this fact by using his (un)employment history as well as regional variables as 
a proxy. Finally, legislation also provides a rather strong incentive to participate in training that is 
supported by payment of MA: times of receipt of MA can extend existing or renew exhausted UB 
entitlements. To be able to control for this fact, we have constructed two variables from the (un-) em-
ployment histories indicating the UB claim at the beginning and at the end of a spell. 
In our data all the factors determining participation mentioned so far can be captured in most cases by 
very detailed proxy variables, in fact much more detailed than usually available in many administra-
tive datasets used for evaluation purposes (see Table A.1 in the appendix for details about all variables 
used). However, as already noted in the previous section, in our data there is no information about the 
caseworker's direct assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the UE, for example with respect to 
his motivation and ability. As usual for these variables, we have to rely on their indirect effects, i.e. on 
their effect on the employment and the earnings history that materialised in the past.  
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4.2 The empirical determinants of programme participation  
Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics for selected socio-economic variables for the different subsam-
ples defined by treatment status. Concentrating on the first five groups included in the econometric 
analysis, the results in this table can be summarised as follows: Participants in retraining are on aver-
age 31 years old, and thus much younger (about five years) than other unemployed which is com-
pletely in line with the idea that substantive human capital investments are most beneficial if the pro-
ductive period of the new human capital is fairly long. Another interesting feature is that the share of 
foreigners in the programme is only about half the share of foreigners in the group of nonparticipants. 
Participants in practice firms and retraining are less educated and skilled than the rest. The mirror 
image of this observation is that participants in short and long training appear to have the best a priori 
chances on the labour market, although the education level of those in short training is somewhat 
lower than for those in long training. Correspondingly, earnings are somewhat higher for participants 
in short and more strongly in long training than in practice firms and retraining. Earnings of the latter 
two groups are almost the same as for nonparticipants. For the two variables indicating remaining UB 
claims, Table 4.1 does not show much variation, though the average remaining claim for participants 
in retraining is about two months shorter than for the other UE. Finally, note that regional and male-
female differences are fairly small.  
The lower part of Table 4.1 refers to one of the main outcome variables used in this study, namely 
whether an individual is employed in particular months before and after the programme. Note that 
when we go back in time, the sample size decreases because more and more young people did not yet 
have their first employment subject to social security contributions which is the key requirement to be 
included in the population from which the data is drawn. 
Due to selecting a sample of unemployed before the programme, the rates decline when approaching 
1993/4, starting with a stable level close to 70%. They are low during the programme (retraining has a 
mean duration of almost two years) and recover thereafter. None of the groups reaches their initial 
level in 1990/2 by 2001, although participants in retraining come close. The rate of recovery for non-
participants is particularly low, already foreshadowing the results of the econometric part below. 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of selected variables by treatment status (shares in %) 
 Nonpar-
ticipation 
Practice 
firm 
Short 
training  
Long 
training  
Retraining Career im-
provement 
Other  
Number of observations 9197 273 572 329 413 110 74 
Personal characteristics 
Women 41 33 37 39 38 24 27 
Age++ * 37 36 35 35 31 32 32 
Nationality:  German 81 87 91 92 89 92 92 
Education: no university entrance de-
gree, no professional degree 25 18 15 9 24 5 5 
Polytechnical or university degree 6 0 6 14 3 10 2 
Position in last job 
Salaried employee 28 34 38 57 23 41 39 
Unskilled worker 40 36 31 19 53 9 2 
Last monthly earnings 
Salary in EUR* 1680 1640 1773 1889 1640 2072 1781 
Remaining UB  claim (before entry in the programme) 
Remaining UB claim (months)* 8 7 8 7 5 7 7 
Legal UB claim at the beginning of the last unemployment spell before the programme 
Legal claim* (months) 13 11 12 11 9 10 10 
Programme information 
Planned programme duration* (months)  6 4 10 20 10 5 
Regional information 
North-Rhine-Westphalia 31 21 28 36 35 23 28 
Rhineland-Palatinate, Hesse, Saarland 17 23 19 18 17 17 19 
Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria 30 26 34 21 22 42 38 
UE rate++ ≤ 5%  1 2 2 0 1 2 4 
5% < UE rate ≤ 10%  64 67 70 62 61 72 76 
UE rate > 10%  35 31 28 38 38 26 20 
Employed in 
                  January 1990 N =    9559 69.5 68.0 67.0 71.3 66.9 81.4 70.5 
                                1992 N =  10609 69.1 67.5 70.0 73.3 68.5 80.6 68.1 
                                1993 N =  10870 60.9 55.7 60.5 64.7 57.8 62.7 63.0 
                                1995 N =  10940 17.8 28.6 29.9 19.8 9.4 32.7 73.0 
                                1997 N =  10872 30.1 43.9 49.4 52.6 46.1 60.6 70.3 
                                1999 N =  10670 33.6 47.4 49.4 51.2 56.8 56.9 59.5 
                                2001 N =  10670 36.3 47.0 52.8 54.9 60.0 61.5 59.5 
Note:  *Numbers marked by an asterisk are means (rather than proportions). ++Measured in the year of the beginning of 
the programme. The sample used for the table is the one after all selection steps described in Section 3, but before 
imposing the common support requirement. For a detailed list of variables see the appendix. 'N =' means the num-
ber of individuals for whom this information is available at that point in time. 
Figure 4.1 provides another look at the monthly employment rate - now centred at the actual or simu-
lated beginning of the programmes - and also the corresponding numbers for the other outcome vari-
able of interest, namely registered unemployment.31 Prior to training, all curves are on a fairly similar 
level, although the employment level of the future retrainees is the lowest one for most of the time 
(and among the highest after the programme). Since being unemployed is a precondition for participa-
tion, the shapes for all subgroups exhibit the usual Ashenfelter's dip (Ashenfelter, 1978) starting about 
two years prior to the actual or simulated programme starts. It must be pointed out that this dip is a 
                                          
31  Note that we define registered unemployment as receipt of UB or UA in the respective month. 
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purely statistical phenomenon coming from the way we selected the sample by enforcing the eligibility 
criterion for participants and nonparticipants.  
Figure 4.1: Employment and unemployment rates by participation status  
         Employment                Unemployment 
 
                Months before and after start of the programme                          Months before and after start of the programme 
                      
Note:  Timing relative to observed or simulated starting dates of programmes. Note that after 80 months the sample size 
starts to decline rapidly. 
After training, the different rates recover quickly, the speed mainly depending on the average pro-
gramme duration. The surprising finding is that for nonparticipants the recovery of the employment 
rate suddenly slows down about one year after the simulated programme start at a level of about 35 to 
40%. This timing coincides with the end of the benefit period for this group, thus suggesting that a 
large group of nonparticipants leaves the labour force after benefit exhaustion. This is reinforced by 
considering unemployment for which no large differences are observed after the initial programme 
period is over (note that programme participation increases the benefit period), therefore more of the 
nonworking people remain registered as UE thus probably making up the difference in employment 
rates. Clearly, combining the fact from Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 that retrainees are no good a priori 
risks on the labour market together with the observation that their long-run employment rates are 
among the highest, already suggests the likelihood of a positive effect for this programme. 
To obtain a better understanding of the empirical selection process and for later use in the matching 
estimator, we estimate a multinomial probit model for the different treatment states. The Internet Ap-
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pendix contains all details of its implementation and the coefficient results. Here, we only report some 
simulations based on this model showing the magnitude of changes in the impacts that some important 
exogenous variables have on the estimated probabilities. The results for some selected covariate sce-
narios are presented in Table 4.2. They more or less confirm the impression from the descriptive sta-
tistics. Whereas differences in sex and employment history are not statistically significant, foreigners 
are more likely to participate, in particular in retraining. Quite surprising a lower education makes 
nonparticipation more likely. 
Table 4.2: Differences of mean probabilities for different values of the covariates (in %-points) 
Changes in covariates Nonparticipation Practice firm Short training  Long training  Retraining 
 mean std. mean std. mean std. mean std. mean std. 
Women - men 1.84  1.25 -1.24 0.85 0.37  0.96 -0.73  0.96 -0.25 0.98 
Nationality: German - foreigner -5.85 1.47 -0.01 0.93 1.97 1.24 0.99 1.32 2.89 1.14 
Education: Low - high  3.26 1.24 0.09 0.85 -0.87 0.99 -1.10 1.06 -1.38 0.87 
Employment states in each of 
the 5 years before 1993:  
unemployment - employment  
-5.49  8.49 3.57  6.00 2.67  7.43 -6.40  4.50 5.65 8.24 
Note:  Probabilities are computed for every individual at each value of the covariates in question given the estimated 
coefficients. Others covariate not explicitly mentioned in the first column are only changed if logically required. For 
example, changing unemployment states change many variables at the same time (see internet appendix for de-
tails). Standard errors of the mean differences over the sample (which should converge to a normal distribution) are 
based on 250 draws from the asymptotic distribution of the estimated MNP coefficients. 
5 Econometrics  
We base our analysis on the prototypical model of the microeconometric evaluation literature with 
multiple treatments: An individual chooses between several states, like participation in a specific 
training programme or non-participation in such a programme. Potential participants in the pro-
grammes are assigned hypothetical outcomes for all states. This model is based on the binary potential 
outcome model (Fischer, 1931, Neyman, 1921, Roy, 1951; Rubin, 1974, 1977) extended by Imbens 
(2000) and Lechner (2001) to multiple, mutually exclusive states. Here, we consider outcomes of six 
different states denoted by 0 1 2 3 4 5{ , , , , , }Y Y Y Y Y Y 32. The different states are called treatments in the 
following to stick to the terminology of that literature. For any individual only one component of 
0 1 2 3 4 5{ , , , , , }Y Y Y Y Y Y  is observable. Participation in a particular treatment m is indicated by the 
realisation of the random variable S, {0,1, 2,3, 4,5}S ∈ . This notation allows us to define average 
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treatment effects for pair-wise comparisons of the effects of different states under the usual assump-
tions (see Rubin, 1974; note that we are not interested in the residual category): 
γ 0m l m l m lE Y Y EY EY, ( )= − = − ; (1) 
θ 0m l m l m lE Y Y S m E Y S m E Y S m, ( | ) ( | ) ( | )= − = = = − = ;      ; , {0,1, 2,3,4}m l m l≠ ∈ . (2) 
γ 0m l,  denotes the expected (average) effect of treatment m relative to treatment l for a participant drawn 
randomly from the population (average treatment effect, ATE).33 ATEs are symmetric (γ 0m l,  = −γ 0l m, ). 
θ 0m l,  is the expected effect for an individual randomly drawn from the population of participants in 
treatment m only (ATE on the treated, ATET). ATETs are not symmetric, if participants in treatments 
m and l differ in a way that is related to the distribution of X, and if the treatment effects vary with X.  
5.1 Identification  
ATEs and ATETs are generally not identified so that additional assumptions are needed. We already 
noted that our data compiled from different administrative records are so rich that it seems plausible to 
assume that we observe all important factors that jointly influence labour market outcomes and the 
process selecting people into the five different states (selection on observables). Therefore, we assume 
that treatment participation and treatment outcome are independent conditional on a set of (observ-
able) attributes (conditional independence assumption, CIA). In other words, there are no exogenous 
variables left out that are both correlated with potential outcomes and the participation decision. Ex-
pression (3) formalizes the CIA on subspace χ  of the attribute space: 
0 1, ,..., | ,mY Y Y S X x x χ= ∀ ∈?  (3) 
where ?  denotes independence. This assumption requires the researcher to observe all characteristics 
that jointly influence the outcomes as well as selection into treatments. In addition, CIA requires that 
                                                                                                                                   
32  The last state '5' contains career improvement and other and will be ignored in the estimation part. 
33  If a variable Z cannot be changed by the effect of the treatment then all what follows is also valid in strata of the data 
defined by different values of Z. 
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all individuals that are part of the evaluation could participate in all states (i.e. 0 ( | )P S m X x< = = , 
0,..., 4m∀ = , x χ∀ ∈ ).  
5.2 A matching estimator 
Lechner (2001) shows that the CIA identifies all effects defined in this section and that expression (3) 
implies independence not only conditional on X but also conditional on the marginal probabilities of 
the states (conditional on X), denoted as 0 1 2 3 4[ ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )]P X P X P X P X P X .34 Based on this 
insight, Lechner (2001, 2002a, b) proposes and applies different matching estimators for that problem. 
Here, we use an improved version of the estimator implemented by Gerfin and Lechner (2002), be-
cause it is simple, seems to perform reasonably well and appeared to be quite robust in different prac-
tical applications (e.g. Larsson, 2003; Gerfin, Steiger, and Lechner, 2004). Moreover, it was subjected 
to Monte Carlo studies (e.g. Lechner, 2002b) investigating small sample problems and sensitivity is-
sues. The different steps of the estimator are described in Table 5.1. In the first step, the multinomial 
probit model is used to estimate the choice probabilities conditional on the attributes. Step 2 ensures 
that we estimate only effects in regions of the attribute space where two observations from any two 
treatments could be observed having similar participation probabilities ('common-support'). Otherwise 
the estimator will give biased results (see Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd, 1998). Note that if we 
are only interested in pair-wise effects the current implementation would be unnecessarily strict, since 
making sure that there is an overlap for each pair would be sufficient. Our implementation has the 
advantage that we evaluate all programmes on the same support. In total, the common support criteria 
discarded only about 6% of participants in retraining, 9% in practice firms, 13% in short training, 
19% in long training, and 24% in nonparticipation. As opposed to the high number for long training, 
note that the high number for nonparticipants is not worrying because they have no implication for 
estimating programme ATETs which are the most interesting quantities. Independent of the common 
support issue, ATE's for the nonparticipants cannot be estimated, because the simulation procedure for 
start dates already renders a group of nonparticipants not representative for the population of nonpar-
                                          
34  Depending on the effect to be estimated, we need to condition only on a subset or functions of these probabilities. For all 
details the reader is referred to Lechner (2001). All details of the estimation of the conditional probabilities can be found 
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ticipants. The unemployed we are losing for long training are most likely older men with a polytech-
nical degree and a comparatively high salary in technical occupations (see the Internet Appendix for 
details). 
Table 5.1: A matching protocol for the estimation of  ,0
m lθ  and ,0m lγ  
Step 1 Specify and estimate a multinomial probit model to obtain  0 1 2 3 4ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦N N N N NP x P x P x P x P x .  
Step 2 Restrict sample to common support: Delete all observations with probabilities larger than the smallest maximum 
and smaller than the largest minimum of all subsamples defined by S.  
Step 3 Estimate the respective (counterfactual) expectations of the outcome variables. 
For a given value of m and l the following steps are performed:  
a-1) Choose one observation in the subsample defined by participation in m and delete it from that pool. 
b-1) Find an observation in the subsample of participants in l that is as close as possible to the one chosen in 
step a-1) in terms of ˆ ˆ( ), ( ),⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦?m lN NP x P x x . 'Closeness' is based on the Mahalanobis distance. Do not remove that 
observation, so that it can be used again.  
c-1) Repeat a-1) and b-1) until no participant in m is left. 
d-1) Compute the maximum distance (d) obtained for any comparison between treated and matched comparison 
observations. 
a-2) Repeat a-1). 
b-2) Repeat b-1). If possible, find other observations in the subsample of participants in l that are at least as 
close as R * d to the one chosen in step a-2) (to gain efficiency). Do not remove these observations, so that they 
can be used again. Compute weights for all chosen comparisons observations that are proportional to their dis-
tance. Normalise the weights such that they add to one. 
c-2) Repeat a-2) and b-2) until no participant in m is left. 
d-2) For any potential comparison observation, add the weights obtained in a-2) and b-2). 
e) Using the weights ( )iw x  obtained in d-2), run a weighted linear regression of the outcome variable on the 
variables used to define the distance (and an intercept).  
f-1) Predict the potential outcome  ( )l iy x  of every observation in l and m using the coefficients of this regres-
sion: ˆ ( )l iy x .  
f-2) Estimate the bias of the matching estimator for  ( | )lE Y S m=  as: 
1
ˆ ˆ1( ) ( ) 1( ) ( )l lN i i i
m m
i
S m y x S l w y x
N N=
= =−∑ . 
g) Using the weights obtained by weighted matching in d-2), compute a weighted mean of the outcome variables 
in l. Subtract the bias from this estimate. 
h) Compute the treatment effect by subtracting the weighted mean of the outcomes in the comparison group (l) 
from the weighted mean in the treatment group (m). 
Step 4 Repeat Step 3 for all combinations of m and l. 
Note: Lechner (2001) suggests an estimator of the asymptotic standard errors for ,ˆm lNγ and ,ˆm lNθ  conditional on the 
weights that we use here. x?  includes the date of the beginning of the programme, sex, three dummies indicating if 
the individual is employed 12, 24 and 48 months before the programme. x?  is included to ensure a high match 
quality with respect to these critical variables. R is fixed to 90% in the application. Note that once we estimate all 
( | )lE Y S m=  for all m, they can be directly used to obtain ( )lE Y . 
In the matching algorithm implemented by Gerfin and Lechner (2002) the same comparison observa-
tion may be used repeatedly in forming the comparison group (matching with replacement). This 
modification of the 'standard' estimator is necessary for the estimator to be applicable at all when the 
                                                                                                                                   
in the internet appendix. In addition to the propensity score, one may condition on attributes included in it to ensure that a 
misspecification in the functional form of the marginal probabilities has only a minor impact. 
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number of participants in treatment m is larger than in the comparison treatment l. Since the role of m 
and l could be reversed in this framework, this is always the case when the number of participants is 
not equal in all treatments. However, when there are other comparison observations which are similar 
to the matched comparison observation, there are easy efficiency gains (without paying a too high 
price in terms of additional bias) by taking these 'very close' neighbours into account and forming an 
'averaged matched comparison' observation. Of course, there are many ways to do this in practice (also 
note the similarity to the idea of kernel matching). Here, our basic consideration is that we are not 
prepared to incur much additional bias, because the variance of the estimator is visible after the esti-
mation, and the bias generally is not. To be conservative in this respect, we consider observations 
which have a distance to 'their' treated observation of no more than 90% (called R in Table 5.1) of the 
worst match we obtain by one-to-one matching (after enforcing common support; R=0 is the case of 
one-to-one matching; R corresponds to a bandwidth choice in kernel weighting).35 To be even more 
conservative, we weight the observations proportionally to their distance from the treated (corre-
sponding to a triangular kernel). The results are not too sensitive to the exact way the weighting is 
implemented. When R is reduced the means change little, but the estimated variances increase. 
However, Abadie and Imbens (2004a) show that dependence on the dimension of the continuous con-
ditioning variables, the usual one-to-K matching estimators where K is a fixed number, may exhibit an 
asymptotic bias, because matches are not exact. Although our weighted matching estimator is 
smoother and thus probably less subject to this problem, we follow their proposal and implement a 
weighted regression based bias removal procedure on top of the matching. The regression is done in 
the comparison sample only. Outcomes are predicted for the attributes observed in treated and control 
samples. Specifically, the outcome variable is regressed on the propensity score and the additional 
variables with weights coming form the matching step (see Imbens, 2004). The difference between the 
mean of the predicted outcomes using the observed X of the treated and the weighted X of the com-
parison observations gives an estimate of the bias (see Table 5.1 for the exact implementation). With-
out the theoretical justification given by Abadie and Imbens (2004b), a somewhat similar procedure 
has been used by in Rubin (1979) and Lechner (2000). 
                                          
35  As for the choice of bandwidth of kernel-matching, there are no theoretical results available for choosing R (see Imbens, 
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For the sake of brevity we do not document the matching quality explicitly, but the weighed matching 
estimator roughly balances the covariates. Detailed results are available in the Internet Appendix. 
We used the same standard errors as Gerfin and Lechner (2002) which are conditional on the weights 
for the comparison observations, because in Monte Carlo simulations they showed (e.g. Lechner, 
2002b) reasonable performance in finite samples (their generalisation to non-integer weights as used 
here is trivial). Unfortunately, alternatives are either not valid, as for example the bootstrap (see 
Abadie and Imbens, 2004b), or have not been adapted to the weighted matching estimators with esti-
mated regressors and have unknown operational characteristics in finite samples (like the matching-
within-the-treated estimators suggested by Abadie and Imbens (2004a). 
6 The effects of training 
6.1 Measurement of the outcomes in the labour market 
According to German legislation one of the objectives of active labour market policy is to increase 
reemployment chances and to reduce probabilities of remaining unemployed. Therefore, important 
outcome variables are those relating to the employment status, like registered unemployment and dif-
ferent types of employment.36 Some types of employment require a certain quality, approximated for 
example by the job's duration and earnings compared to the previous job. Furthermore, as a crude 
measure for individual productivity gross earnings are considered as well. 
Effects are measured beginning in the month after the programme started (with simulated start dates 
for nonparticipants). Focusing on the beginning instead of the end rules out that programmes appear to 
be successful, just because they keep their participants busy by making them stay in the programme. 
We consider a programme to be most successful if everybody would leave for 'good' employment 
immediately after starting participation. Whenever a person participates in any of the programmes he 
is considered as registered unemployed (and not employed). 
                                                                                                                                   
2004). 
36  Here 'registered unemployment' denotes all individuals receiving UB or UA. 
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6.2 Mean effects of programmes for their participants  
Table 6.1 shows the means of the outcomes in the various groups, the estimated counterfactual ex-
pectations and pair-wise comparisons between the programmes and nonparticipation. We concentrate 
on the outcome employment two and seven years after participation started. 
Columns (3) and (4) give the exact sample sizes (after imposing common support) available at each 
point of (process) time. Note that the small decrease in sample size in year seven is due to programme 
participants who could not be observed for all seven years. Therefore, there is loss in precision which 
becomes particularly relevant after eight years (to be considered in the graphs below). 
Columns (5) and (8) show the observed mean outcomes for the participants in programme m (5) as 
well as the observed mean outcomes for participants in programme l (8). Column (6) shows the esti-
mated mean counterfactual outcome of treatment m for population l. Column (7) shows the respective 
estimated mean counterfactual outcome of treatment l for population m. Note that over time, employ-
ment is generally increasing, because the sample is conditioned on being unemployed in month zero. 
The comparison of column (5) to column (6) and of column (8) to column (7) reveals the magnitude of 
the selection bias corrected for by the estimation procedure. It is up to a magnitude of about 9%-points 
for some comparisons. From the direction of the selection correction, we can infer whether one group 
has a priori better or worse chances on the labour market than the other. It turns out that participants in 
short training and to a lesser extent in long training have better a priori chances than nonparticipants 
and participants in practice firms. The same holds true for participants in retraining compared to non-
participants. Note that due to sampling error in the estimates, the results do not allow for a complete 
ranking of all populations. 
The estimates of the mean effects of treatment m compared to treatment l for the subpopulation 
observed in the respective state can be computed directly from columns (5) to (8) and are reported in 
columns (9) to (10) together with an indicator of their asymptotic significance. Column (9) show the 
mean effect for participants in treatment m (difference between column (5) and (7)), while column 
(10) displays the results for participants in treatment l (difference between column (6) and (8)). 
Column (11) shows the effects for the joint population of participants and the nonparticipants. Since it 
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also considers populations other than m and l, it can be larger or smaller than the mean effects for the 
populations m and l.  
Table 6.1: Estimated employment effects two and seven years after the beginning of the programme  
Sample size Outcome Month after beginning m l 
(
| )
mE Y
S m=  
(
| )
mE Y
S l=
(
| )
lE Y
S m=
(
| )
lE Y
S l= ,0m lθ  ,0θ− l m  ,0γ m l  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Practice Firm (m) compared to nonparticipation (l) 
Employed 24 246 6910 42.3 39.7 38.3 34.2 4.0 5.5 5.4 
 84 242 6772 48.8 51.2 44.5 41.0 4.3 10.2 8.9 
Practice Firm (m) compared to short training (l) 
Employed 24 246 501 42.3 43.5 50.6 54.1 -8.3 -10.6 -9.4 
 84 242 494 48.8 52.0 51.5 54.7 -2.7 -2.7 -1.3 
Practice Firm (m) compared to long training (l) 
Employed 24 246 267 42.3 53.2 44.0 49.4 -1.7 3.8 -10.8 
 84 242 263 48.8 52.3 45.8 54.4 3.0 -2.1 1.0 
Practice Firm (m) compared to retraining (l) 
Employed 24 246 386 42.3 43.3 32.1 35.0 10.2 8.3 9.2 
 84 242 381 48.8 49.0 62.5 62.7 -13.7* -13.7 -11.6 
Short training (m) compared to nonparticipation (l) 
Employed 24 501 6910 54.1 48.5 36.5 34.2 17.6* 14.3* 14.8* 
 84 494 6772 54.7 50.9 46.8 41.0 7.9 9.9* 9.6* 
Short training (m) compared to long training (l) 
Employed 24 501 267 54.1 58.0 50.2 49.4 3.9 8.6 -0.9 
 84 494 263 54.7 52.7 46.4 54.4 8.3 -1.7 2.2 
Short training (m) compared to retraining (l) 
Employed 24 501 386 54.1 53.9 32.5 35.0 21.6* 18.9* 19.0* 
 84 494 381 54.7 53.8 62.5 62.7 -7.8 -8.9 -9.2 
Long training (m) compared to nonparticipation (l) 
Employed 24 267 6910 49.4 52.7 41.1 34.2 8.3 18.5* 16.8* 
 84 263 6772 54.4 48.8 48.6 41.0 5.8 7.8 7.1 
Long training (m) compared to retraining (l) 
Employed 24 267 386 49.4 47.7 29.8 35.0 19.6* 12.7 21.6* 
 84 263 381 54.4 52.5 64.2 62.7 -9.8 -10.2 -12.1 
Retraining (m) compared to nonparticipation (l) 
Employed 24 386 6910 35.0 30.4 43.2 34.2 -8.2 -3.8 -4.3 
 84 381 6772 62.7 61.1 47.0 41.0 15.7* 20.1* 19.3* 
Note: Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level, numbers in italics relate to the 10% level and * to the 1% level. 
The results in columns (9) to (11) show that in the long and short run almost all programmes have 
positive effects compared to nonparticipation, although not always significant. The exception is re-
training due to a lock-in effect which is most severe for this particularly long programme. In contrast 
to retraining, long and short training have short-run employment effects in the range of 8-18%, falling 
to about 6-8% after seven years (not significant for long training).  
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The pattern for retraining is quite different. After a negative lock-in effect, the employment effect 
rises to almost 16% after seven years suggesting a substantial and sustainable impact of this expensive 
programme. In the long run, retraining dominates practice firms, but although it seems to have larger 
effects compared to short and long training, the latter are only significant at the 10% level. Among the 
programmes, the effects for practice firms appear to be hardest to pin down. Finally, note that the 
comparison between short and long training reveals hardly any positive returns of the additional in-
vestment in time and money required for long training. In fact, the results are quite positive for a 
'short' programme with a maximum duration of six months and a much lower average duration, al-
though due to lacking cost data, other than very rudimentary cost-benefit considerations are im-
possible. 
Finally, Table 6.1 is informative about the question whether, on average, caseworkers send those types 
of unemployed into the specific programmes that can expect the highest return from it. If this pre-
sumption is true, the effect must be larger for the respective participants (ATET) than for the partici-
pants in other programmes and nonparticipants (ATE). Even without exact standard errors for this test, 
it is obvious that, if there is evidence at all, it suggests that caseworkers do not send those unemployed 
into the programme for which the highest return is expected. 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 display the estimates of the effects of the different programmes (compared to the 
other states) for participants in the respective programme (ATET) for the two different outcome vari-
ables. A line above zero indicates that the programme has a positive effect relative to the programme 
(or nonparticipation) associated with that particular line. In other words, a line above zero is good 
news for the programme appearing in the header of the respective graph and bad news for the one 
associated with the particular line. Only effects significant at the 5% level are displayed. 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 suggest that all programmes have some negative lock-in effect due to reduced job 
search or received job offers during participation in the programme. The length of this negative effect 
is very much tied to programme duration, being about two to three years for retraining, six months to 
one year for long training, three to six months for short training and practice firms.  
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After the lock-in effect, the reemployment chances for participants in practice firms are somewhat 
better than how they would have been in case of nonparticipation, but the effects are only mildly 
significant and appear not to be sustainable. Participating in retraining would have been superior in 
terms of employment chances. 
Figure 6.1: Dynamics of the effects ( ˆmltθ ): Employment differences in %-points 
  
  
  Months after start of the programme                             Months after start of the programme 
               
Note:  Only effects that are significant at the 5% level (point wise) appear in the figures. Sample size declines quickly after 
7 years (84 months). 
After about three years there are substantial positive employment effects (Figure 6.1) of retraining for 
its participants compared to nonparticipation and the other types of training. A positive effect of 
similar size appears for short training compared to nonparticipation although it starts much earlier 
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(nine months) and seems to decline slowly over time. The positive effect for long training compared 
to nonparticipation begins even later (18 months) and is not very incisive after about four years.  
To check whether jobs are (somewhat) stable, we use an outcome variable which requires at least 
seven months of continuous employment (six months is the usual probation period in Germany, within 
that period termination of a job is very easy for both sides). We obtained comparable results. In a simi-
lar vain we coded somebody as employed only if the person received at least 90% of the earnings of 
his last job prior to training. It does not change the conclusions (detailed results are available in the 
Internet Appendix). 
Figure 6.2: Dynamics of the effects ( ˆmltθ ): Unemployment (difference in %-points) 
  
  
 Months after start of the programme                             Months after start of the programme 
       
Note:  See note below Figure 6.1.  
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It is likely that a substantive programme like retraining may not only affect the employment probabil-
ity, but the productivity of the new job as well. For the latter, earnings are a convenient summary 
measure. However, the earnings differences (zero earnings if not employed) are very much driven by 
the employment dynamics and hence, it is not surprising that they confirm the previous results: In year 
seven there is a gain in monthly earnings from retraining compared to nonparticipation of about 400 
to 500 Euros (see Internet Appendix for details). The gains from short and long training compared to 
nonparticipation are positive as well, but about 250 Euros lower than for retraining. 
At least from the point of view of the unemployment insurance system, considering the outcome vari-
able registered unemployment is relevant (Figure 6.2). We find that none of the programmes domi-
nates nonparticipation systematically, probably because programme participation increases the maxi-
mum unemployment benefit entitlement period, so that non-workers have an incentive of remaining 
registered. Thus, the major effect of the programmes compared to nonparticipation is that they bring 
those unemployed back to work that would otherwise leave the labour force. For inter-programme 
comparisons, Figure 6.2 by and large confirms the previous findings. 
The previous figures showed that there are indirect costs of the programmes in terms of the initial 
negative effects most likely due to lock-in, i.e. a reduced job finding probability during programme 
participation. A first step of a cost benefit analysis is to compare the initial negative effects to the 
positive effects that may occur later. To do so, we accumulate the effects over time, starting with the 
first month of the programme. Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show the respective total effects at any point in time 
during the seven year interval for which we have reliable data. Not surprisingly, the effects appear in a 
somewhat different light.  
Considering employment first, Figure 6.3 shows that short training is now clearly the most attractive 
programme. Short programmes have by definition only a small lock-in effect, and thus their positive 
effect accumulates much longer, suggesting a gain of about seven to eight months of employment over 
the seven to eight years following programme start compared to nonparticipation and a corresponding 
gain of about four months compared to retraining. A similar shape shows up for long training com-
pared to nonparticipation, but the level of the effects is somewhat different. There appear to be some 
positive accumulated effects for practice firms compared to nonparticipation as well, but they fade out 
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after six years. For retraining, eight years are not sufficient to recover fully from the initial lock-in 
effect and to create an overall significantly positive effect (compared to all programmes and 
nonparticipation). Assuming a continuing trend, it seems likely that positive effects appear after ten 
years, but of course this projection remains a speculation. Nevertheless, after seven to eight years for 
participants in retraining it is impossible to conclude which of the available training schemes would be 
overall most effective for them. 
Figure 6.3: Accumulated employment effects (
1
ˆ ˆ
t
ml ml
t τ
τ
θ θ
=
= ∑ ) in months  
  
  
 Months after start of the programme                             Months after start of the programme 
  
Note:  See note below Figure 6.1. Read entry for ˆml
tθ   as: "On average for participants in m, t months after beginning 
participation in m, it increased the total time in employment compared to l for by ˆml
tθ  months." 
Figure 6.4 shows that the shapes of accumulated earnings and employment effects are fairly similar. 
After about seven to eight years, the accumulated earnings gains (not discounted) in short training are 
very similar to those in retraining and long training. Compared to nonparticipation the break even 
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point (passing the zero line from negative to positive) for short training occurs in month eight, for 
long training in month 23, and for retraining in month 69. The accumulated effect for practice firms 
becomes positive after month 15, but is always insignificant. 
Figure 6.4: Accumulated effects (
1
ˆ
t
ml
τ
τ
θ
=
∑ ): Monthly earnings differences in 10.000 EUR 
  
  
Months after start of the programme                                   Months after start of the programme 
 
Note:  See notes below Figure 6.1 and 6.3. 
6.3 Heterogeneity by types of unemployed 
Now, we investigate whether groups defined by different exogenous socio-economic characteristics 
exhibit different effects by stratifying the sample along the dimensions unemployment duration, 
regional unemployment rate, type of occupation and education and match within the strata.  
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Table 6.2 displays the results. The number of observations given in the lower part of this table 
indicates that in many cases the subsample estimates will be too imprecise to uncover significant 
differences.37 Despite the problems of precision, some conclusions can be derived from this table. 
Compared to nonparticipation, all programmes are more effective in regions without serious 
unemployment problems and for short term unemployed (less than one year). The most significant 
male-female differences appear with respect to practice firms, which are ineffective for men, but 
highly effective for women. An explanation could be that the types of practice firms men and women 
mainly attend are different (men: mainly manufacturing; women: mainly commercial), so that we 
measure different effectiveness for the two types of programmes instead of a male-female difference. 
Finally, the results concerning education levels and type of occupation confirm the impression that ef-
fect heterogeneity does not appear to be present on a massive scale. 
6.4  Sensitivity analysis 
We performed several sensitivity tests to check whether choices about implementational issues are 
relevant for the results we obtain. For sake of brevity, we summarise the results and refer the interested 
reader to the Internet Appendix for any details.  
First, the common support criterion is made stricter by defining the upper and lower bounds as 10th 
largest and smallest observation instead of the minimum or maximum, leading to a better match in the 
tails of the propensity score distribution. In addition to the condition used before, another 40% of non-
participants are deleted. The corresponding numbers for practice firms are 12%, short training 36 %, 
long training 30% and retraining 35%. Due to the smaller number of observations some effects are no 
longer significant, but the conclusions do not change. 
Second, the additional matching variables other than sex used to define the distance metric in the 
matching algorithm are not used. Again, the results are qualitatively the same, but in particular for 
retraining, the effects are somewhat smaller and fewer of them are significant.  
                                          
37  We use the MNP estimate from the joint model, but the remaining steps of the estimation are performed in the 
subsamples. Therefore, the observations do not add up to the number of the observations in the full sample, because the 
common support criterion must delete more observations if used in subsamples separately (a table with detailed numbers 
is available in the internet appendix). 
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Third, since the effects for men and women based on the common estimation of the MNP model 
showed considerable effect heterogeneity, it might be suspected that more flexibility is required when 
estimating the decision to participate in a programme. Therefore, we estimate MNP's for men and 
women separately but do not find significant differences in the effects compared to the case with a 
common MNP model. 
The next check concerned the question to smooth (and thus increase precision) the estimated effects by 
computing three month moving averages of the respective outcome variables. Not surprisingly, the 
results are a bit 'smoother', but the efficiency gains appear to be very small. 
Fifth, for a selected outcome variable, namely accumulated employment, in the Internet Appendix we 
report the results for simple one-to-one matching as in Gerfin and Lechner (2002). The main change is 
that several positive effects for practice firms compared to nonparticipation are estimated more noisily 
and could not be detected with one-to-one matching. 
Finally, the Internet Appendix reports in detail the estimated asymptotic bias of the weighted matching 
estimator used here (all results are adjusted for this bias). A large and volatile value of it would clearly 
raise concerns about the adjustment procedure. This is not the case, however, compared to the 
magnitude of the effects. 
7 Conclusion 
This paper presents evaluation results for different forms of West German public sector sponsored 
training programmes of the mid 1990s. The empirical analysis is based on a new administrative data 
base constructed for evaluation purposes that supports selectivity correction by microeconometric 
matching methods as well as the identification of effects over a horizon of more than seven years. We 
find that all programmes have negative effects in the short run and most of them positive effects over a 
horizon of about four years.  
However, the results for the various programmes differ quit substantially when considering our key 
outcome variable, employment, seven years after programme start, which is the longest horizon for 
which we have reliable outcome information. Retraining, involving the most substantial investment in 
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human capital dominates all other programmes as well as the state of nonparticipation. The gain in 
employment probability over nonparticipation is about 10-15%-points. This does not only hold for 
participants in retraining, but also for participants in other programmes had they participated in 
retraining. Short and long training dominate nonparticipation with a somewhat smaller gain of about 
5-9% after seven years. Positive effects for practice firms, if any, appear to be too small to be 
detectible with our sample sizes.  
Focussing on the overall performance over the seven year period, i.e. netting out positive and negative 
effects over time, the findings change somewhat, because the different programmes have very 
different lock-in effects that are directly related to their duration. In this comparison, shorter program-
mes (below six months) outperform the rest. Compared to nonparticipation, the gain after seven years 
would be about eight months of additional employment. It is about half for longer training courses 
other than retraining. For retraining, the initial lock-in effects are so large that a period of seven years 
is too short to allow significant positive effects to be detected, although there is a clear trend towards 
positive overall effects. Finally, no sustainable positive effects are visible for practice firms. Compared 
to nonparticipation even after seven years, all programmes increase the duration of benefit receipt. The 
increase due to retraining is about 10 months, for short training it is a few days, for long training 3 
months and practice firms increase benefit receipt by about 4 months. These numbers point again to 
the fact that the positive and sustainable employment and earnings effects of retraining come at a 
considerable cost. 
Our findings help to understand a puzzle that occurred in the previous literature, namely that for most 
training programmes significantly positive effects cannot be found. It may be a needle in a haystack 
problem, i.e. if we believe the kind of consensus of the education literature that returns in earnings of 
one year of full-time schooling are between five and ten percent, then it would be surprising if pro-
grammes for unemployed with a duration of a few months or much less can have effects large enough 
to be detectible by noisy data, even if the samples are large. Yet, even the group of 'shorter' German 
programmes are fairly long by international comparisons, and particularly retraining involves rather 
significant human capital investments that can be expected to be above the ‘noise-threshold’ level, and 
are thus detectible in our study. 
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When trying to relate our finding of positive long-run effects of the long-term retraining programme to 
the literature, we discovered that there are very few evaluation studies for these types of programmes. 
Part of the explanation for this is that only very few OECD countries use long programmes in ALMP, 
and even if those programmes are evaluated, these studies are either not using an implicit or explicit 
control group design or long-term outcomes are not available. An exception is the paper by Winter-
Ebmer (2003) who investigates a special programme used to assist the restructuring of the Austrian 
steel industry. There was a substantial human capital enhancing component in this programme for 
which he finds positive effects five years after leaving the programme. 
To conclude, the literature developed the consensus that it is most important for evaluation studies to 
obtain large and highly informative data to control for selective participation in different programmes. 
In this paper, we acknowledge this fact and use a large and informative database, but we also point out 
that successfully controlling for selection effects does not imply that we are estimating an interesting 
policy parameter. If we want to understand the differential effects of training programmes that sub-
stantially differ with respect to their human capital augmenting nature, data that cover more than two 
to three years after the programme are crucial. However, there is a price to pay, namely that the pro-
grammes under consideration have to be implemented at least about ten years before the study is con-
ducted. Typically, politicians are fairly impatient and econometricians tend to deliver the information 
that the policy makers request. Recent studies based on large and informative administrative data 
which were induced by the respective governments, like Gerfin and Lechner (2002) for Switzerland or 
Sianesi (2004) for Sweden, are interesting for understanding the immediate effects of short pro-
grammes that are not expected to change the long-term prospects of the unemployed by adding sub-
stantial human capital. The reason is that their only long-term effect is indirect by bringing participants 
into employment more or less immediately after the programme. Thus, short-term employment effects 
might be informative about long-term employment effects. If an active labour market policy consists 
basically of these short programmes, like the Swiss one, or the Swedish components Sianesi (2004) 
looked at, then this approach is valuable. However, for the long German programmes with the clear 
intention of substantial human capital addition, short-term effects can rarely be positive because the 
lock-in effect is much more important. Therefore, observing the outcomes over a longer time horizon, 
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e.g. seven to eight years like in this paper, is crucial to obtain some understanding of the overall ef-
fects of these programmes. As an interesting by-product we obtain information whether the short-term 
effects of the short programmes are good predictors of their long-term effects. 
Future work will create a data base containing, in particular, caseworker information which is missing 
from the current data version. However, due to the administrative data collection process this new 
evaluation will only be possible for programmes having started after 2000. Therefore, we expect to 
report new long-term effects of German training programmes based on an improved selection 
correction not before 2010. Until then, the information provided in this paper is probably our best 
guess about long-term effectiveness of training programmes that substantially improve human capital. 
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Appendix A: Data 
Table: A.1: Descriptive statistics 
 Nonpar-
ticipation 
Practice 
firm 
Short  
training  
Long  
training  
Retraining Career 
improve-
ment 
Other  
Number of observations 9197 273 572 329 413 110 74 
Proportions in % 
Personal characteristics 
Women 41 33 37 39 38 24 27 
Older than 50 years 15 7 6 5 1 3 1 
Younger than 26 years  14 19 15 15 21 21 22 
Age* 37 36 35 35 31 32 32 
Nationality:  German 81 87 91 92 89 92 92 
                    Western European 12 7 6 5 7 3 5 
                    Eastern European 4 3 2 1 2 3 1 
                    Other  3 3 1 3 2 3 1 
Marital status: Single 48 60 58 59 62 64 53 
                        Married 52 40 42 41 38 36 47 
Children: No child 62 73 64 65 61 72 58 
               At least one child 38 27 36 35 39 28 42 
Education 
No university entrance degree, no 
professional degree (PD) 25 18 15 9 24 5 5 
No university entrance degree, with PD 65 78 75 71 68 80 81 
University entrance degree, no PD 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
University entrance degree and PD 3 2 3 5 3 5 8 
Polytechnical degree 2 0 3 5 1 5 1 
University degree 4 0 3 9 2 5 1 
Position in last job 
Salaried employee 28 34 38 57 23 41 39 
Part-time worker 10 5 8 7 8 4 4 
Master craftsman 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Unskilled worker 40 36 31 19 53 9 2 
Skilled worker 21 23 23 16 16 45 35 
Industrial sector 
Construction 8 5 6 5 5 14 9 
Commerce 16 16 20 16 12 12 15 
Banking, insurance 1 3 1 3 2 1 3 
Local, regional authorities, social insurance 4        5 5 7 6 4 1 
Non-profit organisations, private 
households 3 3 2 3 4 3 0 
Argiculture, forestry, fishing 1 3 1 1 1 0 0 
Energy and supply industry, mining 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Manufacturing (without construction) 38 40 38 38 41 48 49 
Transportation, telecommunications 5 4 5 4 7 3 7 
Other services 23 20 21 22 22 15 16 
Last monthly earnings 
Salary in Euros* 1680 1640 1773 1889 1640 2072 1781 
No information++ 11 3 4 4 3 5 3 
Regional information 
Big city (at least 300,000 inhabitants) 26 18 24 29 20 26 7 
North (Hamburg, Bremen, Schlesw.-H.)      22        30 19 25 26 18 15 
North-Rhine-Westphalia 31 21 28 36 35 23 28 
Rhineland-Palatinate, Hesse, Saarl. 17 23 19 18 17 17 19 
Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria 30 26 34 21 22 42 38 
Local UE rate ≤ 5% ** 1 2 2 0 1 2 4 
Local 5% < UE rate ≤ 10% ** 64 67 70 62 61 72 76 
Local UE rate > 10%   ** 35 31 28 38 38 26 20 
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Table: A.1: Descriptive statistics (continued-1) 
 Nonpar-
ticipation 
Practice 
firm 
Short  
training  
Long  
training  
Retraining Career 
improve. 
Other  
Last occupation in/as 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 2 2 2 3 3 0 0 
Plumbing, metal construction technology 9 15 11 7 9 19 7 
Food and nutrition 4 2 4 1 4 2 4 
Construction, woodworking 10 8 8 5 9 15 15 
Merchant (goods and services) 9 12 12 9 6 5 7 
Transportation, storage 13 12 14 9 15 3 15 
Administration, office work, business, social scienc. 14 22 22 31 13 17 16 
Health services 2 1 1 1 3 2 3 
Hairdressing,guest assist., housekeeping, cleaning 8 6 3 2 7 3 1 
Chemical worker, polymer processing 3 1 1 2 6 1 0 
Unskilled worker 2 4 2 1 2 0 1 
Metal production and processing 4 5 4 2 6 2 8 
Textile, leather, clothing 3 1 1 2 2 0 1 
Security services 1 1 1 1 1 4 0 
Paper manufacture and processing, printing 2 2 2 2 2 4 1 
Social services, education, counselling 3 0 0 2 4 2 1 
Media, humanities, arts 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Mining 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Technology, natural sciences  4 1 6 16 2 15 14 
Machinist 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Electronics 4 2 3 4 4 7 4 
Stone, ceramics, glass making and/or processing  1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Remaining unemployment (UE) benefits claim at the end of the last unemployment spell before entry in the programme 
Remaining UE benefits claim (in months)* 8.1 7.4 7.8 7.2 5.8 6.8 6.5 
No information or no claim  44 48 44 42 38 27 31 
Legal UE benefits claim at the beginning of the last unemployment spell before the programme 
Legal claim* (months) 12.6 11.0 11.5 10.6 9.3 10.1 9.6 
No information  26 29 28 24 25 17 20 
No claim 4 5 3 4 3 3 3 
Unemployment benefits or assistance in the month before the beginning of the programme 
UE benefits 73 71 72 76 75 83 80 
UE assistance 27 29 28 24 25 17 20 
Various historical un/ out-of/employment  information before the "first unemployment period" 
Months of last employment spell* 50 44 51 49 40 48 45 
Proportion of employment months (in %)*      72 70 72 72 70 80 75 
Proportion of out-of-labour months (in %)*      13 12 13 13 16 11 10 
Proportion of UE months (in %)*  11 12 10 9 9.03 43 8 
# of programs up to 2 years before the UE 
period (UEP)* 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.08 
# of programs  up to 5 years before the UEP* 0.18 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.26 0.19 0.22 
# of programs from entry in the data up to UEP* 0.28 0.45 0.39 0.40 0.34 0.25 0.41 
Mean duration of UE spells  
        up to 2 years before UEP* 1.48 1.74 1.30 1.19 1.23 0.69 0.87 
        up to 5 years before UEP* 2.77 3.05 2.31 2.03 2.30 1.16 1.77 
        from entry in data to UEP* 3.95 4.09 3.5 3.3 2.95 2.13 3.04 
Mean duration of employment spells   
       up to 2 years before UEP* 3.7 3.5 3.3 4.6 4.8 4.8 3.8 
       up to 5 years before UEP* 12.1 12 12.4 14.8 13.2 13 16.5 
       from entry in data to UEP* 48.6 42.0 48.6 47.5 35.7 47.3 41.5 
Mean duration of out-of-labour spells   
       up to 2 years before UEP* 2.20 1.91 1.70 1.70 1.39 1.11 1.62 
       up to 5 years before UEP* 3.61 3.22 2.95 2.94 3.60 3.19 3.86 
       from entry in data to UEP* 7.58 5.64 7.66 9.25 8.82 6.72 6.58 
Total months in all programmes up to 
        2 years before the UEP* 0.73 0.52 0.47 0.76 0.70 0.63 0.46 
        5 years before the UE P* 1.32 1.54 1.55 1.53 1.48 0.95 1.54 
        before entry in the sample* 2.07 2.89 2.85 2.73 2.04 1.65 2.58 
Programme information 
Planned programme duration* (months)  5.95 3.82 9.74 20.43 9.91 5.09 
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Table: A.1: Descriptive statistics (continued-2) 
 Nonpar-
ticipation 
Practice 
firm 
Short  
training  
Long  
training  
Retraining Career 
improve. 
Other  
Various un/employment information from the "first unemployment period" 
Duration of the "first UE spell"* 7.60 6.55 6.91 6.59 5.56 5.26 4.42 
Duration of last UE spell before programme* 6.75 5.49 5.57 5.30 4.49 4.25 3.95 
Time since beginning of last UE spell (before 
prog.) even if other state between UE and prog.* 6.77 6.60 7.08 6.60 5.61 5.60 4.85 
Time between the prog. and last job* 15.0 13.4 13.8 12.3 11.0 9.7 10.8 
time between programme - last job ≤ 3 months     16 11 16 17 22 26 20 
                                     ≤ 6 months  35 37 39 43 43 46 59 
                                     ≤ 12 months  62 67 67 67 74 75 78 
                                     ≤ 24 months   84 88 91 90 92 95 92 
Transition in 6 months before programme: 
                     UE. → UE 58 56 61 56 54 44 42 
                  empl. → UE 26 27 27 33 32 39 45 
                     out → UE 14 16 10 10 10 8 11 
                  prog. → UE 2 1 1 1 4 9 3 
Number of prog. in year before actual progr.* 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.05 
Number of prog.'s in 6 months before actual pr.* 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.03 
Firms size of the last employer  
No information 4 4 4 3 3 4 5 
1 to 9 employees 21 21 21 19 18 27 27 
10 to 99 employees 36 36 38 36 35 31 30 
100 to 499 employees 21 25 22 23 23 24 26 
500 employees or more 19 14 15 18 21 15 12 
Timing of programme and appearance in data on average (average month) 
Date of entry in the data*  Oct. 83 Dec. 83 Jun. 83 Aug. 83 May 85 Jul. 84 Apr. 84 
Date of UE spell defining treat. status* Oct. 93 Aug. 93 Sep. 93 Sep. 93 Sep. 93 Jul. 93 Sep. 93 
Date of begin of prog.* Jul. 94 Mar. 94 May 94 May 94 Mar. 94 Jan. 94 Mar. 94 
Date of exit from the data* May 00 Dec. 00 Feb. 01 Jan. 01 May 01 Jan. 01 Apr. 01 
Outcome+ 
Unemployment in Jan. 1990 9559 17.7 21.5 20.4 16.6 15.3 5.9 18.0 
                                 1992 10609 19.1 21.3 17.9 15.5 15.9 9.3 17.4 
                                 1993 10870 24.7 30.8 27.9 21.9 31.5 30.0 27.4 
                                 1994 10960 66.2 77.7 72.9 70.5 74.8 78.2 52.7 
                                 1995 10940 65.1 60.4 64.2 73.6 86.4 60.9 16.2 
                                 1997 10872 37.1 39.9 32.2 30.4 40.8 18.4 14.9 
                                 1999 10670 28.4 30.1 28.5 23.8 24.6 15.6 20.3 
                                 2001 10670 19.2 24.1 21.4 15.7 17.0 10.1 12.2 
Employment in Jan. 1990 9559 69.5 68.0 67.0 71.3 66.9 81.4 70.5 
                                 1992 10609 69.1 67.5 70.0 73.3 68.5 80.6 68.1 
                                 1993 10870 60.9 55.7 60.5 64.7 57.8 62.7 63.0 
                                 1994 10960 24.1 17.2 22.7 22.5 20.3 14.6 41.9 
                                 1995 10940 17.8 28.6 29.9 19.8 9.4 32.7 73.0 
                                 1997 10872 30.1 43.9 49.4 52.6 46.1 60.6 70.3 
                                 1999 10670 33.6 47.4 49.4 51.2 56.8 56.9 59.5 
                                 2001 10670 36.3 47.0 52.8 54.9 60.0 61.5 59.5 
Out-of-Labour in Jan. 1990 9559 12.7 10.5 12.7 12.2 17.9 12.8 11.5 
                                 1992 10609 11.8 11.2 11.9 10.9 15.6 10.2 14.5 
                                 1993 10870 14.4 13.6 11.6 13.4 10.7 7.3 9.6 
                                 1994 10960 9.7 5.1 4.4 7.0 4.8 7.3 5.4 
                                 1995 10940 16.9 11.0 5.9 6.7 3.9 6.4 10.8 
                                 1997 10872 32.6 16.2 18.3 17.0 12.9 19.3 14.9 
                                 1999 10670 37.9 22.6 22.1 25.0 18.7 26.6 20.3 
                                 2001 10670 44.6 29.0 25.9 29.3 23.1 28.4 28.4 
Note:  The sample used for the table is the one after all selection steps described in Section 3, but before imposing the 
common support requirement. *The results for variables marked with an asterisk are means rather than propor-
tions. **Local unemployment rates for each of the 141 local labour office districts. +The different outcomes do not 
add up to 100% because of some missing values. ++ The category 'No information' includes both cases with miss-
ing earnings information and with the entry '0'. Zero entries are made for so-called inactive employment which in-
cludes women on maternity leave, men in the military or civil service, as well as employees having been ill for more 
than six weeks.  The first column gives the number of observations used to compute the proportions. The sample 
size decreases due to different entry dates into the sample (first UE spell in 93/94) and exit dates from the sample. 
Results for subpopulations with less than 50 observations are not reported.   
